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The Status of Animals in Biblical and Christian 
Thought: A Study in Colliding Values 




A common contemporary view is that the Bible and subsequent Christian thought 
authorize humans to exploit animals purely as means to human ends. This paper argues 
that Biblical and Christian thought have given rise to a more complex ethic of animal use 
informed by its pastoralist origins, Biblical pronouncements that permit different 
interpretations, and competing ideas and doctrines that arose during its development, 
and influenced by the rich and often contradictory features of ancient Hebrew and Greco-
Roman traditions. The result is not a uniform ethic but a tradition of unresolved debate. 
Differing interpretations of the Great Chain of Being and the conflict over animal 
experimentation demonstrate the colliding values inherent in the complex history of 
Biblical and Christian thought on animals. 
 
Recent secular interpretations have tended to portray Biblical and Christian thought as encouraging the 
domination and exploitation of nonhuman animals. For example, Edward Payson Evans, Lynn White Jr., 
Peter Singer, and Roderick Frazier Nash,2 among many others, have interpreted the Genesis account of 
creation as the beginning of Judeo-Christian oppression of animals and nature. In Genesis, God gave 
humankind “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over 
all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”3 This is often read as God’s 
granting a license to treat animated nature as a mere means to human ends. Genesis is the origin, it is 
frequently argued, of a consistent Christian disregard for the value and well being of animals. Thus, White 
interpreted the Biblical creation story to mean that God had planned all of nonhuman nature, “explicitly for 
man’s benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose but to serve man’s purposes.” 
And Singer prefaced his account of Christian thought regarding animals with the statement: “To end 
tyranny we must first understand it.” 
It is our contention, however, that such interpretations constitute a misreading of Genesis, that they 
ignore traditional understanding of Biblical passages regarding animals, and that they fail to recognize the 
complexity of the development of animal ethics in the Christian tradition. We do not contend that the 
tradition has consistently acknowledged the inherent worth of animals or has led to satisfactory treatment 
of animals. Rather, it is a complex and inchoate tradition in which the status and appropriate treatment of 
animals have been repeatedly discussed and debated. 
Animals in the Scriptures 
It was one of Karl Marx’s more perceptive insights, later borrowed by determinist sociologists in general, 
that a society’s values and ideas reflect primarily the self-serving demands of the society’s economic 
organization. According to that view, attitudes to animals in Christian thought must first be understood in 
the context of the pastoralist culture in which they arose. The pastoralist economy hinges on the use of 
domestic animals as repositories of wealth, sources of food, and items of trade. In Marxian analysis, 
animals must be viewed as possessions that can be used for human purposes; moreover, for pastoralists 
to prosper, perhaps even to survive, these living possessions must be treated with appropriate care. 
What Marxian economic determinism obscures from our view is that this balance between ownership and 
care was achieved in early Biblical thought by granting animals a special status. Unlike human artifacts 
such as the hoe and the plough, animals were seen as having been created by God and entrusted to 
humans for care in a relationship that the translators of the Bible into English termed “dominion,” a 
translation that does scant justice to the Hebrew term rādâ.4 
This term can be interpreted in two ways. One is a kind of despotic domination such as the subjugation of 
one people by their enemies (Judges 14:4; Nehemiah 9:28). The other, as John Passmore notes, would 
imply treating animals “in a manner of a good shepherd, anxious to preserve them in the best possible 
condition for his master.”5 In the second sense, “dominion” was also used to describe God’s relationship 
with the world (Psalm 72:8). Writers such as White and Singer evidently assume that the dominion 
granted to humans in Genesis implied despotic subjugation. According to Andrew Linzey, however, this 
interpretation “conflicts with a great deal of scholarly evidence.” Linzey points out that human dominion 
over other creatures was granted in the context of creating humans in God’s image. In that context, 
humans were intended to share not only some of God’s prerogative but also, in Linzey’s words, “his moral 
nature”, acting toward creation as God had done, bringing order to chaos and bringing blessing and 
goodness, not tyrannical mastery, to the world.6 
Indeed, that was the more customary historical interpretation of “dominion.” In Seasons of 1728, James 
Thomson, former divinity student, understood our role as “the Lord and not the Tyrant of the world.” In 
Self-Interpreting Bible of 1776 John Brown, the staid Biblical traditionalist, declared it an “honourable 
dominion over the creatures.” “Gentle dominion,” avowed George Nicholson in his 1801 On the Primeval 
Diet of Man. In 1802, Joseph Ritson described the dominion of Genesis as instituted, “for the sake of 
authority, protection, and the glorious offices of benevolence and humanity.” In her popular novel Agnes 
Grey (1847) Anne Brontë insisted that the passage, together with other Biblical texts, implied a significant 
human responsibility to what she called our fellow “sentient creatures,” although her commentary also 
showed how the issue was a cause of constant dispute between the compassionate and the selfish. 
Other commentators too saw the message of stewardship and responsibility extending well beyond 
Genesis. Thus, in An Essay on Humanity to Animals (1798), the Anglican priest, Thomas Young, cites 
passages from Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Proverbs, Jonah, St. Matthew and 1 
Corinthians to argue that God cares for the animal realm and requires us to do likewise. Victor Hugo, a 
Roman Catholic, tells us in Les Misérables (1862) that according to St. Matthew “duty to all living 
creatures” is one of the four duties of humankind.7 
The scriptures, particularly the Old Testament, repeatedly reinforced the care aspect of the relationship. 
For the great King David, an early indication of his suitability as a monarch was his diligence and courage 
in protecting his father’s sheep (1 Samuel 17:35). Later, when the prophet Nathan rebuked David for 
abusing his power, he did so by first telling a story about a poor man who lavished care and affection on a 
lamb (2 Samuel 12:2), thus not only evoking David’s sympathy but also reminding him of the proper 
relationship of monarch to subject. When God selected Rebecca as the wife of Isaac and the mother of 
her nation, the sign that she had been chosen was her willingness, when asked for water by a thirsty 
stranger, to water his camels as well, “until they have had enough” (Genesis 24:19) - itself no mean feat. 
Indeed, a conscientious shepherd protecting a flock of sheep was such a positive image that it became a 
common metaphor for divine goodness (Psalm 23:1-4), and sometimes descriptions of divine love even 
began to sound like lessons in animal husbandry: 
For these are the words of the Lord God: Now I myself will ask after my sheep and go in 
search of them. As a shepherd goes in search of his sheep when his flock is dispersed all 
around him, so will I go in search of my sheep and rescue them no matter where they 
were scattered. . . . I myself will tend my flock, I myself pen them in their fold, says the 
Lord God. I will search for the lost, recover the straggler, bandage the hurt, strengthen 
the sick, leave the healthy and strong to play, and give them their proper food. Ezekiel 
34:11-16 (The New English Bible) 
Thus, the pastoralist culture of the Bible could hardly be described, other than for ideological reasons, as 
encouraging ruthless exploitation of animals. It was, rather, a culture that recognized animals both as 
possessions who can be used and killed for human purposes and, at the same time, as wards entrusted 
by God to humans for diligent care. 
These two elements, though making sense in a pastoralist context, may appear contradictory in later 
historical contexts, and perhaps this seeming contradiction has encouraged many modern scholars to 
emphasize one element, usually the first, at the expense of the other. Perhaps the very existence of this 
tension, heightened by the plausibility of different interpretations of Biblical texts has encouraged an 
ongoing debate in the Christian tradition. 
A third element also important in Christian thought, if less stressed in Biblical texts, furthers this tension. 
The scriptures and later Christian philosophy sometimes treat animals not merely as living possessions 
deserving diligent care but, by a relationship bordering on kinship, as close links to humankind - partly 
because both humans and other species came into existence as works of God. Thus, the writer of 
Ecclesiastes (3:18-20) noted that humans and animals alike are created from dust, return to dust, and 
that “all draw the same breath.” Isaiah (11:6-8) describes a kinship utopia in which the wolf dwells with the 
lamb, the leopard lies with the fatling, and the child has no fear of the asp. 
Unlike the often quoted account of creation in the more recent P-narrative (Genesis 1), in which humans 
are told to “subdue” the earth and have “dominion” over other species, the older J-narrative (Genesis 2) 
presents a very different view of the human-animal relationship. In The Yahwist’s Landscape, Theodore 
Hiebert explained that P’s view is conspicuously hierarchical. At creation, God commands humans to rule 
(rādâ), to exercise dominion over other animate life (1.28). 
Whether one wishes to construe such rule as benevolent or harsh - and both are possible within the limits 
of the term in biblical usage - there can be no doubt that rādâ represents control and power, since it is 
used customarily of kings and always of those with authority over others. By contrast, J conceives of this 
relationship in terms that are more communal. As animals and humans alike are made from the earth’s 
topsoil, they possess no distinct ontological status, both being referred to simply as living beings . . .8 
In the J-narrative, we read that God placed the first man in the garden and then, out of concern that the 
man was alone, formed the animals and the birds and brought them to him, though none proved to be a 
fully satisfactory companion. Later, God’s promise never again to flood the earth took the form of a 
covenant made not only with humans but with all animals as well (Genesis 9:9-17). 
Other passages explicitly extend human moral requirements beyond those of pastoralist husbandry. The 
Talmud tells us, “It is forbidden, according to the law of Torah, to inflict pain upon any living creature, 
even if it is ownerless,” thus indicating that our responsibilities extend to animalkind in general, not only to 
animals as possessions. The writer of Proverbs (12:10) tells us that it is a “righteous” person (not merely 
a prudential one) who avoids cruelty and “regardeth the life of his beast.” Moreover, the Book of Enoch 
(7:4-5), a Judaic text of around A.D. 150,9 almost certainly based on earlier sources, tells us that it was 
only after the flood that humans “began to sin against birds and beasts and reptiles and fish, and to 
devour one another’s flesh and to drink the blood.” Early Christians accepted The Book of Enoch as one 
of the Holy Scriptures.10 A fourth century Bishop of Constantinople, John Chrysostom, proclaimed: 
“Surely we ought to show other [species] great kindness and goodness for many reasons, but above all 
because they are of the same origin as ourselves.”11 
Many animal-oriented Biblical passages pertain to domestic animals, which is scarcely surprising in a 
pastoralist context. Biblical references to wild animals are often less positive. For example, David was 
celebrated for having killed wild animals when necessary to protect his father’s sheep. Nonetheless, 
various passages portray wild animals as also important to God. Psalm 104, for example, portrays God as 
having created the earth for the bene.t of wild animals and birds as much as for humans and their 
domestic herds and flocks. Moreover, in the speech to Job from the whirlwind, God uses a series of 
rhetorical questions to illustrate divine care for species of animals that are of no utility to humans. God 
asks, for example, “Who provides the raven with its quarry when its fledglings croak for lack of food? Do 
you know when the mountain-goats are born or attend the wild doe when she is in labour? . . . Who has 
let the wild ass of Syria range at will and given the wild ass of Arabia its freedom?” (Job 38:41; Job 39:1 & 
5, New English Bible). 
Some of those of faith have described a sense of kinship with animals a derivable not only from the 
scriptures but also from reason (John Locke), or from the intuitions of the human soul (Dostoevsky and 
Tolstoy). Carl Gustav Jung describes it as resting “on the deeper foundations of a primitive attitude of 
mind - on an unconscious identity with animals.”12 These thinkers and authors of the scriptural passages 
just cited believe that a form of kinship links animals to us, that animals are more than just our wards, and 
are worthy of concern in their own right. 
The Great Chain of Being 
In the development of Christian animal ethics many traditional legends emphasizing our relationship to 
the animal realm were Christianized and localized. Androcles and the lion, for example, became St. 
Jerome and the lion in the west, St. Sergey and the bear in the east. Many of the saints were known by, 
and sometimes sanctified for, their animal relationships. Along with the famed case of St. Francis of 
Assisi, we find, for example, Blaise as patron saint of sick cattle, who gave sanctuary to wild animals, Gall 
as patron saint of birds, who shared his cave dwelling with a bear, and numerous other instances.13 This 
does not dispel the colliding values inherent in Christian thought. A loving father may well have related St. 
Jerome and the lion to his children of an evening before visiting the churchyard the next day to participate 
in a cockfight more or less sanctioned by the clergy.14 
It is, however, with the development of the idea of the Great Chain of Being (scala naturae) - described by 
Arthur O. Lovejoy as “one of the half-dozen most potent and persistent presuppositions in Western 
thought”15 - that we encounter most clearly the inherent tension in attitudes to animals. The concept had 
its origins in classical Greece but was first systematized by the vegetarian, Plotinus, in the third century 
A.D., and it came to the fore in the early Middle Ages, dominating Western thought until the latter half of 
the eighteenth century. The doctrine arranges everything in nature hierarchically in its appropriate niche, 
from the angels through humankind (in some versions with Europeans before Asians, Amerindians, and 
Africans and men before women) to the higher mammals to the lowest insects. 
In recent scholarship, the negative elements of the Great Chain have been emphasized, claiming that the 
doctrine differentiated superior humans from lesser creatures and that humans were free to use animals 
at their whim. David Maybury-Lewis asserts that in the chain, “man . . . was most perfect,” which 
persuaded “man . . . that the natural world was his to exploit.”16 Richard Milner tells us that the scale 
treated the inferior realm as “base.”17 The doctrine, so we are led to believe, was oppressive of other 
species. And so it was in some cases. François Fénelon (1615-1715), theologian Archbishop of Cambrai, 
used the phrase, “more perfect,” to describe human superiority. In addition, Fénelon followed Aristotle 
and Aquinas in asserting, “in nature not only the plants but the animals are made for our use.”18 Cornelius 
a Lapide (1567-1637), a Flemish Jesuit, went even further, announcing, “lice, flies, maggots and the like 
were not created directly by God but by spontaneous generation, as lice from sweat.”19 Such creatures 
were so beyond significance in the scale that God would not have deigned to create them. 
It is, however, a gross misreading of the scala naturae to deem it a consistent repudiation of the worth of 
animals. The writings of Macrobius, Cardinal Bellarmino, and Leibniz20 emphasized the proximity to each 
other of the beings of the chain. In Instinct Displayed (1811) the Quaker, Priscilla Wakefield, used the 
idea of the chain to argue the case for our responsibilities to other creatures.21 In the Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1690), the Puritan, John Locke, laid stress on nonhuman reason and the linkage 
of everything in nature: 
There are some Brutes, that seem to have as much Knowledge and Reason as some 
that are called Men; and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are so nearly join’d, that if 
you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be 
perceived any great difference between them; and so on till we come to the lowest and 
most inorganical parts of Matter, we shall see everywhere, that the several Species are 
linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees.22 
In Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), Locke draws the appropriate conclusions and insists that 
children should be raised to abhor the mistreatment of “sensible,” that is, sentient, creatures. In Essay on 
Man (1734), Alexander Pope, a Roman Catholic, writes that the interdependence of human and animal 
should be stressed: 
Vast chain of being, which from God began. . . . Connects each being, greatest with the 
least; Made Beast in aid of Man, and Man of Beast; All serv’d, all serving! Nothing stands 
alone; The Chain holds on, and where it ends, unknown. (1.8.5 and 3.1.22-26) 
In Metamorphose der Tiere (1819), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe states explicitly: “Each animal is an end 
in itself (Zweck sein selbst ist jegliches Tier).” Goethe followed Leibniz and Spinoza in arguing that each 
animal species is in itself an instance of perfected design, in contrast to the view of Fénelon and others 
that perfection increases as we move higher in the Great Chain. The continuity of nature was an 
important theme for Goethe who invested considerable energy in anatomical research to prove that there 
is no significant discontinuity between humans and other species. Moreover, Nicholas Boyle, Goethe’s 
finest biographer, goes so far as to assert that after 1783, for Goethe, “the supreme religious issue is not 
the relation between men and gods . . . but the relation between man and animals.”23 
In the late eighteenth century, the poetry of the devout and mystical William Blake and the Divine Love 
and Wisdom of the equally devout and mystical William Swedenborg emphasized an anti-rationalist 
appreciation of the animal realm, apparently unconstrained by the Great Chain concept. Nonetheless, the 
dominant theological influence in the late eighteenth century and in much of the nineteenth century was 
William Paley’s “Theory from Design,” which greatly resembled the Great Chain of Being and could be 
used, like the Chain itself, to elevate or demean the animal realm. Explicitly in the writings of John Ray (a 
pre-Paleyan exponent of the theory), Gilbert White, and William Cowper, we find the theory employed to 
raise the status of animals.24 
Thus, it is unwarranted to imagine the Great Chain, or its Paleyan derivative, as solely, or even primarily, 
a justification for oppression. It was, like so much of Western thought, a doctrine that allowed different 
interpretations and emphases and constituted one of the arenas of colliding values that have suffused 
Christian animal ethics. 
Animal Experimentation 
The collision of values is again clear in the centuries-long debate on animal experimentation. 
Traditionally, René Descartes is offered as the exemplar of the Christian rationalist tradition, treating 
animals as irrational machines on whom experimentation may be performed without fear of wronging 
them. In recent years, there has been a dispute as to whether Descartes allows for animal sensation25 but 
little disagreement about whether Descartes felt his theory justified his own animal experimentation or 
whether other animal experimenters used Descartes’ views to justify their use of animals. Of perhaps 
greater importance, many modern commentators have asserted that Cartesianism has become the 
pervasive later attitude in the Western world. To take but one example, Jim Mason tells us that, 
More than any other thinker, Descartes detached humanity from the natural world and set it up as the 
ruling class, aloof from and absolutely unrelated to its underlings. From him we get the thinking that 
prevails in the modern era - that of a human race so superior to the rest of nature that we are distinctly 
apart from it.26 
Mason’s claim has some merit, but, in its hyperbole, it distorts both Descartes’ view and, more 
emphatically, its role in the later Christian tradition. Thus, in a 1645 letter, Descartes’ advice is that one 
should not “imagine . . . the earth [made] for the bene.t of man, [nor attribute] to other creatures 
imperfections which do not belong to them, in order to raise himself above them.”27 Moreover, many 
Christians were aghast at Descartes’ apparent treatment of animals as nothing more than machines. 
Henry More, the celebrated Cambridge Platonist who greatly influenced Isaac Newton, accosted 
Descartes in a 1648 letter “with the internecine and cutthroat idea that you advance in the [Discourse on] 
Method, which snatches life and sensibility away from all the animals . . .”28; and in his Metaphysical 
Colloquy of 1641 Pierre Gassendi, a Roman Catholic priest, ridiculed Descartes’ illogical inconsistencies 
with regard to the rationality and sentience of animals.29 The very reason that we know that Port-Royal 
Jansenist vivisectors deemed the cries of their canine victims nailed to a board as “only the noise of a 
little spring that had been touched” is because of the ire the seminarians aroused.30 And Robert Boyle, 
the reputed English chemist, complained in 1686 that, 
The veneration wherewith men are imbued for what they call nature has been a 
discouraging impediment to the empire of man over the inferior creatures of God: for 
many have not only looked upon it, as an impossible thing to compass, but as something 
impious to attempt.31 
We should take at least as much note of the “many” who found the experiments “impious” as of the views 
of the experimenters. 
Later, we may encounter Claude Bernard being aware of the animals on whom he experimented as 
nothing but organisms that conceal from him the problem he is seeking to resolve. Bernard’s Introduction 
to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865) convinced the medical community of the value of the 
artificial production of disease by chemical and physical means through reliance on animal models.32 
Nonetheless, we should not imagine Bernard as the ultimate representative of an ongoing Cartesian 
victory. Those who were appalled at animal experimentation included Joseph Addison, Alexander Pope, 
Samuel Johnson, Victor Hugo, Christina Rossetti, Alfred Lord Tennyson, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin 
and C. S. Lewis.33 To take but a few examples, in To Mr. Congreve (1693), Jonathan Swift, the Dean of 
St. Patrick’s, reflected and advanced public antipathies to the scientific passion for dissecting animals 
dead and alive. In Miscellanies I (1743), Henry Fielding, the novelist, penned a satirical and caustic 
parody on Experiments on the Cuttlefish by Abraham Tremblay, as reported in the proceedings of the 
Royal Society (407, January 1742/3). Robert Browning wrote two anti-vivisection poems (“Tray” (1879) 
and “Arcades Ambo” (1889)) and remarked further that he would “rather submit to the worst of deaths, so 
far as pain goes, than have a single dog or cat tortured on the pretence of sparing me a twinge or two.”34 
Robert Louis Stevenson strenuously opposed experiments on proverbial guinea pigs, even though the 
experiments were designed to provide a cure for a disease from which he suffered.35 
If one follows the determinists, Marxian or otherwise, in understanding ideas and values in their economic 
and social context, one may recognize that the human health interests of the society, the professional and 
pecuniary interests of the experimenters, and the personal interests of the afflicted will have played a 
major role in determining their attitudes toward experimentation. Thus, their “unconscious identity with 
animals” (Jung) would have threatened their economic, social, and medical needs. Cartesianism provided 
a convenient philosophical rationalization. However, it would be unwarranted to conclude, as the above 
examples of opponents of animal experimentation reflect, that human self-interest was always dominant. 
The Complexity of the Conflicts 
In much of the recent intellectual discussion of Christian animal ethics, we encounter the assumption that 
the Christian voice is one. For example, several writers have referred to the Christian doctrine that 
animals do not have immortal souls.36 Certainly, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, among many others, 
conform to the supposed doctrine, even though they acknowledge a minor level of obligation toward other 
species - Augustine telling us it would be inappropriate to kill even a fly to gain a coveted award37 and 
Aquinas praising the merits of kindness toward animals.38 Yet, the popular and influential kabbalist, 
Robert Flood (1574-1637), proclaimed that immortal souls inhabited animals as well as humans, a view 
reiterated by the devout William Wordsworth (among many other Romantics, including Coleridge and 
Southey)39 at the turn of the nineteenth century. In Man’s Mortality (1643), Richard Overton, the 
revolutionary Puritan leveler, proclaimed, “all other Creatures as well as man shall be raised and 
delivered from death at the resurrection.” 40 The view was consistent with that of Arnobius and Origen in 
the early Christian years, John of the Cross in the sixteenth century, John Milton and the Cambridge 
Platonists (including Henry More) in the seventeenth, and repeated by the Reverend John Hildrop, the 
Reverend Richard Dean, and Leibniz in the eighteenth. Moreover, Bishop Joseph Butler, with Paley the 
most influential Anglican theologian of the eighteenth century, thought it a nigh certainty that animals had 
immortal souls while John Wesley, founder of Methodism, could see no reason why they would not.41 
Stevenson thought dogs would be in heaven before any of us. Neither Christianity specifically, nor the 
Western mind generally, is in unison on the issue. 
In fact, there are great varieties in attitudes to animals among, say, the Desert Fathers of the fourth 
century, the Albigensians of the twelfth, Franciscans of the thirteenth, Puritans of the seventeenth, official 
Catholics of the nineteenth, and Old Order Mennonites of the twentieth. In addition, there is considerable 
variety within each of these. Close identification with animals was relatively common among the Celtic 
saints but less so among the Italian saints. Thus, the Christian attitude to animals is, in the words of 
Linzey, “an ambiguous tradition.”42 
As a generality, to which there are numerous exceptions, we may say the unsympathetic Fénelon position 
played the major (but not sole) role in Catholic thought, the sympathetic Goethian position found its major 
(but not sole) expression in evangelical and secular traditions. As late as 1984, the Roman Catholic 
Church was still reiterating the Aquinas-Fénelon message when Pope John Paul II announced, “it is 
certain that animals are intended for man’s use,” though that did not imply that we lacked certain fairly 
minimal obligations toward them. The Goethian image looms large in the explicitly Christian novels of the 
Brontë sisters, Dostoevsky, Victor Hugo and Tolstoy – covering Protestant, Orthodox, unofficial Catholic 
and unorthodox Christian viewpoints. When we look to early animal welfare legislation in Britain, 
evangelical Christians are its prime (but not sole) movers, aided by the pens of such established church 
animal welfare proponents as Richard Dean, Humphry Primatt, Thomas Young, and John Styles.43 
Indeed, the early English Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, instituted to enforce the 
legislation, declared itself to be “conducted on exclusively Christian principles.”44 
Thus far, in describing the conflicting Christian views of animals, we have tended to draw fairly simple 
battle lines and to locate different individuals on opposite sides - Boyle, Descartes and Bernard as 
supporters of vivisection and More, Swift and Johnson as opponents. With animal issues, however, we 
often see a degree of conflict or contradiction within the thinking of individuals, such that even writers 
commonly claimed as defenders of animal exploitation often have another side to them. Notoriously, St. 
Augustine paid little heed to animal interests, yet still avowed that 
All things, which are, are good . . . beasts and all cattle, creeping things and fowls of the 
air . . . praise Thy name. . . . I decided that all things above were better than those below, 
but that both together were better than the things above alone.”45 
Equally notoriously, Immanuel Kant insisted that “Animals are not self-conscious, and are there merely as 
a means to an end. The end is man.” Yet Kant appears less confident of this conclusion when he adds, 
“the more we come into contact with animals the more we love them, for we see how great is their care 
for their young.” Further, William Leiss, in Domination of Nature, tells us that Francis “Bacon’s great 
achievement was to formulate the concept of human mastery over nature much more clearly than had 
been done previously and to assign it a prominent place among men’s concerns.”46 Nonetheless, that 
selfsame Bacon around 1597 commended “Charity” to animals, and complimented the Turks because 
they “are kind to Beasts, and give Alms to Dogs and Birds.” He averred that “The inclination of Goodness 
is imprinted deeply in the nature of Man; insomuch that, if it issue not toward Men, it will take unto other 
living creatures.” This he acknowledged a part of the “Goodness of Nature.”47 
To summarize, within Christian thought we see a history of conflict and contradiction that defies any 
simple classification. Some of the conflicts involve different denominations with different views about the 
human-animal relationship. However, within denominations, there also have been competing views, and 
sometimes the debate has occurred within individual souls. 
Concluding Remarks 
Biblical and Christian thought presents us with a complex view of the status of animals. At a fundamental 
level, animals are viewed through a pastoralist lens, whereby certain use of animals is seen as legitimate 
while diligent care of animals is highly valued. Nonetheless, Christianity shares with a number of other 
religions the belief that all creatures are God’s creatures and recipients of divine concern. How these 
beliefs are to be interpreted and translated into action has been the subject of recurring debate. It has 
been a debate influenced by economic forces, ecclesiastical institutions, sheer individual and collective 
self-interest, as well as by honest, legitimate, and well-considered differences of interpretation. The result 
has been and likely always will be a lack of consistency. 
In describing the complexity of Biblical and Christian thought about animals, we are not claiming that 
human treatment of animals in the West is, or has been, salutary. Nonetheless, setting the record straight 
has important practical implications. If, as some have claimed, Christianity gives humans license to 
dominate and exploit nonhuman animals at will, then any significant reform in our treatment of animals 
would require a repudiation and reversal of the West’s most influential religion. But if, as we argue, the 
Christian tradition is more complex, in many cases emphasizing both human and divine care of animals 
while legitimizing certain forms of animal use, then at least some reforms would require that the Christian 
West collectively remember, rather than repudiate, its most fundamental principles of animal ethics. 
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